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THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax System 
Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among researchers, 
academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper examines taxpayers’ protests against amended assessments received from the 
Australian Taxation Office (Tax Office), prompted by their involvement in tax effective 
schemes. Considering this issue through ‘social movement’ literature, and focussing on the 
Goldfields region of Western Australia, it aims to explore why some individuals became 
involved in schemes and why they later felt justified in protesting publicly against the Tax 
Office. It does not aim to access the ‘truth’ of claims by investors that they merely wanted 
to secure their financial future through legitimate investments, versus other’s claims they 
were knowingly practicing tax avoidance. Nor does it aim to make judgments on who is 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Instead it considers the ‘stories’ that are motivating protestors’ actions 
now. These stories are important, as they are the moral foundations for subsequent and on-
going protests. They also help to understand the ways in which this issue has impacted 
individuals and communities ‘culturally’, beyond the obvious financial and legal issues. 
 
The main findings are that investors feel their personal and collective identity has been 
severely infringed by amended assessments. Protests are not just about money but are 
fundamentally moral claims over their rights and roles as ‘honest’ Australian citizens. 
Social movement literature helps to show how these moral claims are not experienced as 
separate from protestors’ financial, self-interested concerns. Rather, they are ‘read through 
the lens’ of culture and emotion, providing a ‘moral shock’ to investors’ identity and 
feelings of security.  
 
These findings have implications for governance in Australia. For one, government 
agencies have in recent times been keen to incorporate the language of fairness and 
openness into their ambits. However, being seen to then be institutionally inflexible and 
without a ‘human face’ when dealing with citizens – a point expressed continually by 
investors in this case study – can prove hugely damaging in the long term. It may be too 
late to re-engage these investors into a culture of voluntary compliance. However, being 
aware of the potential impact that administrative and legal decisions can have on citizens 
beyond the realms of finance could prove a first step in enabling the reflexive and 
responsive institutions, which citizens have come to hope for, and even expect, in 
contemporary Australia. 
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‘Say no to the ATO’: The cultural politics of protest against the Australian Tax 
Office1 
Kersty Hobson 
 
Introduction: The rise of tax effective schemes and investors’ protests  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, the Tax Office became increasingly concerned about 
‘aggressive tax planning’ practices, wherein accountants and clients search for legal – 
often marginally so – ways of minimising tax. Although such practices have a long history, 
their availability was seemingly growing in terms of number of schemes available. They 
were also spreading geographically, moving from urban to suburban and rural areas; and 
socially, from high income to middle income individuals.  
 
One such set of practices is ‘tax-effective investment schemes’ (‘schemes’ herein), defined 
as any arrangement that is entered into by a taxpayer in order to obtain a tax benefit. These 
can include ‘round-robin schemes’, including complex non-recourse financing of 
agriculture, afforestation and franchise schemes. During the 1990s, scheme deductions 
claimed by Australian taxpayers grew from $A176 million in 1994 to over $A1 billion in 
1997 (Laurence, 9 March 2001). By 2002, it was calculated there were about 40 000 
investors involved in over 160 schemes across Australia (Buffini, 2002).  
 
Alerted to the growth in deductions being claimed the Tax Office examined the financing 
arrangements of schemes. They ruled that some scheme involvement amounted to tax 
avoidance, thus contravening Australian Tax Law. As a result, all deductions previously 
claimed for participation in the disputed schemes plus between 5% and 50% penalty and 
13.86% interest were claimed by the Tax Office. This process began in 1998 and took the 
form of issuing involved taxpayers with amended assessments (Senate Economics 
References Committee, 2000; attachment A). Individual assessments range from $20 000 
to over $200 000, with an average of $75 000 (Senate Economics References Committee, 
2001b), allegedly totalling an estimated $A4.3 billion in deductions claimed.  
                                                 
1 The present paper was written at the end of 2001 reflecting the scheme situation at that time. 
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Protests against amended assessments and the Tax Office 
 
In reaction, some affected taxpayers have been vocal in protests against their assessments 
and the Tax Office. They argue that schemes were sold to them by independent promoters 
and marketed as legal means of investment, thoroughly endorsed by various institutional 
authorities (see below for further discussion). Whereas the Tax Office are within their legal 
ambit to take such action and impose these levels of fines, some investors feel the 
treatment is harsh, financially untenable and contrary to a spirit of fairness that state-
individual relations should adhere to. As a result, many have utilised bureaucratically 
endorsed channels of appeal to object to the situation (for example, ATO internal appeal 
system, the Taxation Ombudsman). Some have also been publicly protesting in attempts to 
get their tax debts and their reputations cleared. The ultimate aim of these protests is to 
persuade the Tax Office to draw a ‘line in the sand’ (that is, cancel all affected 
assessments).  
 
Although exact figures are sketchy, it appears that the majority of investors have so far not 
settled with the Tax Office. For some, this is because they cannot afford to or have been 
told by their legal and/or financial advisers to wait until relevant court judgments are 
known. However, others have no intention of paying their bills, saying they will not pay 
the Tax Office a ‘red cent’. Indeed, the issue has remained in somewhat of a deadlock 
since late 2000, with many of the Tax Office’s subsequent concessions to investors falling 
on deaf ears2.  
 
                                                 
2 For example, in April 2001, the Tax Office offered some scheme investors a reduction of interest on their 
assessments, from 13.86 to 4.72%. In return, they did not have to disclaim any future legal action against the 
Tax Office, they just had to enter into a payment arrangement (see Senate Economics References Committee 
(2001a) - Inquiry into Mass Marketed Tax Effective Schemes and Investor Protection: Interim Report, 
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia). Few took up the offer. To follow, on 14 February 2002 the 
Tax Office announced a compromise settlement for investors. This consisted of all penalties and interest 
being removed from amended assessments, as well as investors being allowed to keep or claim deductions 
for any cash personally paid into the schemes. By December 2002, 87% of the investors had settled. 
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Along with refusals to pay, an informal protest network of affected investors has emerged, 
which has been responsible for organising public marches, meetings, and stoking media 
interest in the issue. One geographical focus of both payment-refusals and overt protests is 
the Goldfields region of Western Australia, especially the city of Kalgoorlie-Boulder. 
Although protests in this region are nothing new, this issue has caused great institutional 
consternation and public interest, taking politicians, the Tax Office and the Australian 
media by surprise. As the Australian Taxation Ombudsman has dryly put it: 
 
‘… the ATO had not given any real consideration to how these taxpayers might 
respond to the ATO’s proposed amendment action or the likely impact this would 
have on ATO operations’ (Commonwealth Ombudsman, 2001, p. 25).  
 
As a result, the Tax Office is sponsoring court cases in relation to schemes in attempts to 
set legal precedence3. Indeed, throughout the rulings and protests, the Tax Office has 
maintained its line that this is an issue of tax law that is resolvable through judicial 
channels. 
 
Structure of paper 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. A brief theoretical discussion 
examines how ‘social movement’ literature can help understand the collective and personal 
reasons for protests against the Tax Office. Then, the research aims and methods used in 
this paper are discussed. The context for this research is then outlined by examining key 
economic and geographical features of the Goldfields region, and some characteristics of 
the protests to emerge from the region. This is followed by considering why individuals 
became involved in schemes, focussing on their ‘stories of justification’. These stories lay 
the foundation for discussing why Goldfields residents felt compelled to publicly defy the 
Tax Office, in terms of its assault to their individual, collective and regional identity. The 
reasons why this happened in the Goldfields as opposed to elsewhere in Australia are then 
                                                 
3 On Friday 15 March 2002 the Federal Court returned the judgment that the Tax Office was correct in ruling 
involvement in the Budplan scheme contravened Australian Tax Law (Buffini & Fabro, 2002). Other court 
cases are on-going. 
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discussed. The concluding sections consider the implications of this research for issues of 
governance and tax administration in Australia. 
 
Theoretical premise: Social movements and citizenship protest  
 
This paper considers investors’ refusals to pay and their protests against the Tax Office 
from the perspective of ‘social movement’ literature. This literature is concerned with why 
and how individuals become involved in forms of collective and sustained social protest. 
Its usefulness in this case study is its ability to connect individual motivations and 
concerns, and the stories they tell about their lives and actions, with broader social issues 
and changes (for a social psychological analysis of this case study, see Murphy, 2002). 
This is important, as understanding protest necessitates not only consideration of social and 
structural factors but also the ‘moral sensibilities and convictions’ of individuals (Jasper, 
1997, p. 5 & p. 11). 
 
As such, it is argued here that investors’ protests signal the articulation of a ‘moral 
sensibility and conviction’ through being an unusual form of protest on two fronts. First, 
the background hum of low-level citizen non-compliance, a seemingly intractable part of 
any tax regime (Braithwaite, forthcoming) has been turned up to full volume. Second, 
many new forms of protest belong to what researchers call ‘new social movements’. These 
are protests that concern lifestyle or ‘post-material’ issues, such as animal and gender 
rights. Investors’ protests appear different from these new social movements, pertaining 
instead to economic and distributive issues. This last point is important as it enables us to 
ask an integral question – if protests do not concern usual subjects of new social 
movements, what are they about? 
 
Understanding social protest: putting citizen concerns back into economic protest 
 
Scheme investors’ protests without doubt have financial and material foundations. These 
are often discussed in social movement literature as theories of ‘resource mobilisation’. 
This is a rational-actor or economic-actor perspective that considers the potential gains or 
losses an individual faces through taking part in protest (Polletta & Jasper, 2001). As such, 
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it has relevance to this case study. Investors potentially have a great deal to lose if they 
comply with the Tax Office’s wishes in the short term, that is, pay their bills (although in 
the long term this strategy may very well prove costly in light of the legal precedent set by 
the Budplan ruling).  
 
However, this theory alone does not help understand protestors’ actions completely, as 
protests also have strong moral and identity drivers. Although never directly called so by 
the Tax Office, investors feel the implication that they are ‘tax cheats’ assaults both their 
self-identity and their public persona. Therefore protests are about economy and identity at 
the same time. Indeed, a key point this paper aims to make is that these two drivers to 
action are often researched as if they are mutually exclusive; or that they matter at different 
times in a protest cycle; or that some individuals are concerned with money whilst others 
care about identity. Instead, the following discussion aims to show that Goldfields protests 
have both a moral identity and financial foundation, which occur simultaneously and are 
inseparable in the eyes and minds of protestors.  
 
Indeed, the inclusiveness of the spheres of morality and the economy underpins these 
protests, possibly marking an emerging area of contestation in Australia. This is one where 
citizens do not read tax rulings simply as administrative decisions to be dealt with through 
bureaucratic procedures and deferred to through the rule of law. Rather, they are read as 
comments on and threats to individual and family identity, security and their social 
position as ‘ordinary’ Australians. Braithwaite (forthcoming) has aptly named this as 
marking a form of ‘new defiance’. Here, citizens believe there should exist a form of social 
contract of care and mutual respect between state and taxpayer. In this research, investors 
believe this contract has been breached, making tax a site of ‘cultural politics’ (Nash, 2000, 
2001), wherein identities and sites of power are re-drawn and contested.  
 
This argument aims to build upon Melucci’s (1989) discussions of the difference between 
citizenship and post-citizenship protests. Melucci’s arguments run counter to the many 
researchers who suggest that citizenship struggles over basic social equality and the 
redistribution of social ‘goods’ have been eclipsed in countries like Australia by post-
citizenship issues such as animal rights or lifestyles politics. Although movements that 
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focus on these issues are indeed prevalent, Melucci argues that citizenship struggles are in 
fact alive and well, along with the on-going debates of what it means to be a ‘citizen’ today 
(for example, Hudson & Kane, 2000). His point is that citizenship struggles have become 
less easily recognisable because their traditional forms have changed. 
 
For example, conflicts over work rights were once geographically, issue and class specific 
(such as, strikes by dockworkers over pay and conditions, and protests at the start of the 
industrial revolution about the threats to labour posed by new technology). Now the 
dimensions of class, space and issues of public concern have been reshaped by multi-level 
social and labour changes. This makes protest diffuse and not easily placed within distinct 
spatial and social boundaries. As such, protests may concern specific ‘interest’ issues 
whilst simultaneously raising concerns what modern citizenship means today (Probyn, 
1997, Yuval-Davis, 1999). Indeed, it is argued that at all protest foundation is the personal 
and collective need for a sense of ‘ontological security’ within contemporary conditions of 
flux and seeming instability (Turner, 2001).  
 
This redrawing of the forms of protest is echoed throughout this case study, which, this 
paper argues, is fundamentally about being an Australian citizen today. For one, schemes 
have affected people all across Australia. Rural and urban dwellers from all walks of life 
and professions are arguing that their current and future livelihoods are now severely 
threatened. This has given rise to multiple sites and forms of protest, prompted by different 
actors throughout the on-going period of protest. As a result, protests are diffuse, multi-
faceted and touch upon an array of issues that stretch from immediate financial concerns to 
what now constitutes being a ‘decent and honest’ Australian. 
 
Research Aims and Methods 
 
Taxation is not just a fiscal issue. It also encompasses the social and moral spheres of 
equity, community, and governance (see Blumenthal et al., 2001, Braithwaite, 
forthcoming, Coleman & Freeman, 1997), as well as being part of broader social 
institutions that help carve the ‘cultural constructions of identity’ (Taylor, 1998, p. 338). 
Understanding taxpayers’ behaviour requires understanding their values, experiences, 
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contexts and motives, as well as economic attitudes and circumstances. To this end, the 
Centre for Tax System Integrity at the Australian National University undertook research 
to investigate further why some Goldfield residents chose to take part in these schemes, 
and why they have refused to pay their amended assessments with such force, unity and 
conviction. The Goldfields was chosen as protestors were accessible, in terms of being 
willing to talk about their experiences, and also because of the intensity of protest to 
emerge from the area.  
 
Qualitative research methods were used to draw an in-depth and contextual picture of 
events from the voices of the individuals affected. This research had several facets. First, 
available literature, press clippings, Internet sources and official reports were collected and 
analysed for content, to understand not only some of the central arguments but also to see 
how they were discursively constructed. Second, two researchers undertook fieldwork in 
the Goldfields region. Here, interviews were conducted with 29 investors, recruited 
through key community individuals, willing to share their contacts and networks. 
Interviews were semi-structured, wherein interviewees were asked to talk about their 
reasons for scheme involvements, their amended assessments, how they had responded to 
and feel about these events, and their possible futures. As well as scheme participants, 
three community workers who had not invested in schemes but have been central to 
subsequent protests were interviewed4. Also, whilst in the Goldfields further relevant local 
information was collected, and participant observation was possible through, for example, 
attending a public meeting about the schemes, hosted by Senator Shane Murphy and held 
in Kalgoorlie town hall on Tuesday 23 October 2001. In addition, a one-hour interview 
was carried out with three Tax Office staff in Canberra directly involved in the dealing 
with aggressive tax planning issues. 
 
All interviews were taped and transcribed. Both sets of texts – documents and transcripts – 
were analysed using open coding methods, to draw out both the main descriptive and 
analytical points (see Strauss, 1987), and the two researchers cross-referenced codes and 
                                                 
4 They were a local accountant, a coordinator of a community legal centre, and a mine manager from 
Kalgoorlie. 
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analyses for validity and triangulation. The quotes in the remainder of the paper are drawn 
verbatim from the interviews although names have been deleted for reasons of 
confidentiality. 
 
However, it is important here to draw attention to a couple of methodological caveats. 
First, this research was not aiming to secure a ‘representative’ sample of investors from 
whom generalisations can be drawn that can then be applied to thousands of other 
investors. Rather, the aim was to get an in-depth look at the contexts and processes taking 
place, which are generally not accessible through large-scale survey research. Or as Jasper 
(1997, p. 11) has put it: ‘To understand why and how people protest, we need to know 
what they care about and how they see their place in the world’. It can be argued that the 
Goldfields is an aberration in terms of how other investors across Australia have reacted. 
The point to make is that this is the very reason why it is of research interest. Why have 
such strong feelings against the Tax Office been voiced in this area and what are the bases 
of these protests? These questions are important as sites of conflict and protest often can 
tell us a great deal about social changes taking place, as they represent openings or 
cleavages in social relations. 
 
The second point to make is that this research cannot say anything about why others in the 
Goldfields did not invest in the schemes. For one, it is difficult to find out how many 
people were offered the schemes and turned them down in proportion to the number that 
invested, owing to the ad hoc and informal ways in which schemes were promoted. 
Theoretically, it was possible to ‘ask around’ whilst in the Goldfields, to try and talk to 
people who chose not to get involved. However, the sensitive and personal nature of the 
issue, and anger it evokes in some people made the researchers decide not to talk a great 
deal about their reasons for being in the Goldfields except to the pre-contacted 
interviewees. This is an acknowledged gap in this research and could possibly be redressed 
by asking interviewees if they knew of people in their networks who thought of investing 
and decided against it, and who would be willing to talk about it. 
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The Western Australian Goldfields: Setting the scene 
 
The Goldfields region in Western Australia was targeted strongly by promoters of schemes 
and thus, hard-hit by subsequent amended assessments. Located in outback (inland) 
Western Australia, the region has an estimated resident population of approximately        
59 000, with the city of Kalgoorlie-Boulder housing the highest proportion at 32 000 (see 
http://www.gedc.wa.gov.au/fr-populat.html). Aboriginal communities have historically 
occupied the area (for example, Christensen, 1979). In the late 1800s Irishman Paddy 
Hanlan found gold, heralding an influx of Anglo economic interest and people that 
continues today (see Blainey, 1993), which has displaced and marginalised the indigenous 
occupiers (Howitt, 1990). In general, the Goldfields today can be characterised as: 
 
… isolated regional mining and pastoral centres with relatively small populations 
and hundreds of kilometres away from Perth. Geographically, the regions cover 
thousands of square kilometres and include small mining towns and camps, long 
established pastoral centres with perhaps only a few dozen inhabitants, and 
aboriginal communities with limited facilities and shifting populations. For the most 
part the environment is harsh and unforgiving with extremes of temperature. 
(Chidlow, 1998) 
 
Mining, mostly of gold and nickel, is still central to the regional economy. This creates a 
profile of young and mobile workers who move to the area to take advantage of the 
reported high wages (for example, Patterson Market Research, 1999), estimated at about 
157% the national average (see http://www.kalgoorliecci.asn.au/living). 
 
However, this is not ‘easy money’. High wages are earned by working 14-hour days 
underground, often 13 consecutive days out of 14. Mining remains a harsh and sometimes 
unsafe industry (for example, Nichols, 2001), that takes a toll on individual health and 
family life but which still draws a great deal of labour into the area (see Stimson, 2001). 
This all takes place in a region where living costs, especially food and fuel prices, are 
relatively high, and state and federal infrastructure and welfare investment is declining, a 
pattern similar elsewhere in rural Australia (for example, Panelli, 2001). In this context, 
some workers are paying the top tax bracket of 47 cents in the dollar, leaving many to feel 
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that although on paper they appear well off, in reality their disposable income does not 
match the ardour and personal costs of their employment. 
 
Community reactions to amended assessments 
 
This combination of high wages, high taxes and a ‘get in, get ahead and get out’ approach 
of many working in the Goldfields made it a lucrative focus for the individuals marketing 
and selling schemes. As a result, nearly 1000 individuals in the Goldfields (half of these in 
Kalgoorlie-Boulder) are recorded by the Tax Office to be scheme participants and have 
received, or will receive, amended assessments. 
 
Starting in late 1999 amended assessments started to arrive in Goldfield residents’ 
letterboxes. As more and more people received letters, word spread informally through 
community and work networks about the number of people affected and the despair being 
felt. Community workers in Kalgoorlie-Boulder became concerned about the emotional 
impact this was having. As a result, a public meeting was organised in early 2001 and the 
Goldfields Legal Community Centre circulated a short questionnaire around Kalgoorlie-
Boulder to gauge the number of people involved and their experiences to date. The 277 
questionnaires returned showed great emotional distress and hardship being felt by 
investors and the families of amended assessment recipients (Harris et al., 2001).  
 
However, private despair quickly turned into public outrage. During 2001, the region 
became a focus of protest against the Tax Office’s actions. As well as public meetings and 
marches, other forms of protest emerged that were less geographically specific. These 
included the establishment of three ‘fighting funds’ that aimed to enable investors to 
collectively fight the Tax Office through the courts, open to all affected to join. Also, 
Internet discussion and resistance groups were set up that now involve scheme investors 
from all over Australia (for example, Project Tax Resolution Group - 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/australian-project-tax-resolution). Although the core group 
of protest organisers in the Goldfields probably does not amount to more than 20 people, 
the attendance at marches and meeting has been high, and the Internet chat sites have 
hosted thousands of messages to date. Thus, rather than consisting of a permanent body of 
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members, these protests have been populated by a loose collective of individuals, who 
have moved into and out of organisational roles and have contributed different voices over 
time. 
 
Overall, these protests have been significant in turning what was ostensibly a private 
financial issue into one of community and nation. It quickly grabbed media attention, 
starting with the Goldfields, then State, and then national press, and eventually including 
prime-time national television5. Prime Minister John Howard visited Kalgoorlie in April 
2001 and proclaimed his belief that investors were not ‘tax cheats’ but that it was not 
within his authority to intervene in the Tax Office’s actions. The Senate Economics 
Reference Committee of the Commonwealth of Australia established and conducted an 
extensive ‘Inquiry into mass marketed tax effective schemes and investor protection’. This 
process began in June 2000 and ended in February 2002, producing three substantial 
reports detailing evidence received from 899 submissions and numerous public hearings 
held in five locations (Canberra, Melbourne, Kalgoorlie, Perth and Sydney). Thus, a great 
deal of public and private time, energy and money has been expended to try and get to the 
‘bottom’ of the issue, both from a legal and a contextual perspective. 
 
Why invest in tax effective schemes? The search for motivations 
 
Before considering why individuals became involved in social protest against the Tax 
Office, it is important to understand why they invested in the first place, as, it is argued 
here, the two strands of questioning are inextricably linked. To begin, there has been much 
speculation by politicians, the public, the Tax Office and the media about the character and 
motives of the individuals involved in schemes. Much commentary has either cast affected 
taxpayers as financially self-interested and greedy system players (‘tax cheats’) and/or as 
irrational and misguided simpletons (‘tax dupes’) (see Murphy & Sakurai (2001) for 
further discussion of this argument in tax compliance literature). Although these debates 
                                                 
5 This took the form of the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s (ABC) investigative journalism 
programme called Four Corners airing a programme dedicated to the issue on 18 June 2001 (see 
http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/s312807.htm). 
 12
touch upon some of the key drivers in the social protests, this rather simplistic dichotomy 
fails to consider the contextual factors of individual’s initial investment and subsequent 
protests. 
 
Understanding the context of investment: Situational and circumstantial factors 
 
The question of motives for scheme involvement can be argued as having two sides. The 
first is logistical and practical, with a simple answer to ‘why did they get involved in 
schemes?’ being ‘because they were offered them’. For one, taking advantage of the 
opportunity to pay less tax in a way promoted as legitimate makes individual’s 
involvement unsurprising. Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) research has shown that 
31% of Australians, responding to a survey on attitudes towards the tax system, reported 
legally minimising their tax. A further 4% said they did so through risky ventures and 55% 
said they were prepared to ‘play around’ with their tax situation (Braithwaite et al., 2001). 
Although in comparison to other post-industrial countries Australians on average see tax 
fraud as relatively serious, it still remains a ‘grey zone of morality’ (Evans & Kelley, 
2001). Some interviewees in this research did indeed express the feeling that they were 
paying ‘too much’ tax, and were open about looking for ways to minimise their tax 
payments, with many making comments like ‘I don’t mind paying tax but …’. 
 
Yet, tax minimisation is not in itself illegal, unlike tax avoidance (although there is a 
substantial grey area between the two: see Pagone, 2000). This argument was picked up 
strongly by interviewees. For example: 
 
I think if they’re really honest, there’s obviously an intention to try and save tax, but 
to avoid it no way. I mean, these guys – this argument that I had with X, he was 
going on about tax avoiders and I said to him, ‘Hey, hey, these people are working 
84 hours a week and they’re paying 42 of it to you lot, so who is cheating who 
here?’ He didn’t like it, but that’s the reality. My husband works. He paid nearly 
$1700 of his last fortnight’s pay in tax. So why bother to work 84 hours a week. So 
I can understand why they would have tried to reduce the amount of tax they were 
paying, but I don’t believe they’re trying to avoid it. 
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Added to this, the accessibility of schemes made getting involved all too easy. In the same 
way that many new ideas and practices spread quickly through social networks of 
colleagues and friends (Rogers, 1995), potential investors heard about the schemes through 
their own networks. Many reported seeing others reaping the rewards of tax rebates over 
the years – a new car here, a holiday there – and thus took their cues for the reliability and 
legitimacy of these schemes from others. In the extract below the interviewee explains how 
scheme promoters encouraged him to get involved: 
 
They said, ‘Look, we’ve just signed up all these people up in Kalgoorlie.’ There’s a 
police department in Kalgoorlie. Well, I knew a couple of coppers in Kalgoorlie and 
I thought, ‘Well, if you signed those boys up … well, they’re not really dills, I’ll be 
all right.’ I fell into it, you know. 
 
Most schemes were marketed as legal and sound investments, one endorsed by a QC 
(Queen’s Counsel) and others by local accountants and financial advisers, who, research 
has shown, have substantial effects on the tax behaviour of clients (Schmidt, 2001). To 
double-check their legitimacy, 25 investors interviewed sought independent advice from 
financial planners, accountants, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
(ASIC). A few even reported calling the Tax Office to ask about their legality, saying the 
Tax Office thus gave them the ‘all clear’. Finally, these schemes were sold shrewdly by 
promoters. They cold-called, canvassed, offered ‘spotters fees’, utilised networks, made 
friends and positioned these schemes as something with a limited supply that only a fool 
would turn down – or ‘mate, you’d be the only one who misses out’ as one interviewee 
reported – all to great success. Thus, to ask ‘why’ here, the answer could easily be ‘why 
not?’ 
 
‘Stories of motivation’: Or, why the truth is not ‘out there’ 
 
The second side to the ‘why’ question is one of personal motivation. Within political and 
media discussions of the issue this question has been framed as a black and white debate of 
‘are they tax cheats or were they fooled by wily promoters?’ (for example, in the Four 
Corner’s programme). The problem with pursuing this line of questioning is multiple. For 
one, it assumes that information and knowledge is the only factor here – ‘did they know or 
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not?’ By contrast, although without doubt many tax decisions are carefully planned, many 
others are often a matter of convenience, opportunity and context (Smith & Kinsey, 1987). 
Also, tax decisions are not just the domain of individual rationality but are often family, 
relational and contextual matters (Smith & Kinsey, 1987). This means that finding out 
what one person thinks and feels about tax is not a comprehensive way of understanding 
the actions and practices of that individual. 
 
Finally, research can never truly uncover individuals’ initial motivations for investing in 
schemes, as they no doubt have become clouded by subsequent events. Even though many 
interviewees admitted wondering if they had been foolish and inept in their actions, they 
were reluctant to take the blame for events, as: ‘even if being inept isn’t one’s fault, it still 
is a less than admirable aspect of selves, one that we might conceal rather than advertise’ 
(Sabini & Silver, 1997, p. 4). 
 
The selective and creative nature of memory and the psychological need to maintain an 
integrated sense of the self thus results in past actions becoming shrouded by current 
concerns and debates. One example can be seen when a much-vilified scheme promoter 
gave evidence to the Senate Estimates References Committee. Here, he insisted that whilst 
in the Goldfields potential investors came looking for him, implying he was simply 
responding to market demands. Investors insist otherwise, stating they were directly 
targeted. In the absence of documented evidence, research cannot uncover who is right or 
wrong or the nature of the ‘real’ events, as this necessitates making a moral judgment 
about who is more likely to be telling the truth. It also raises the spectre of epistemological 
debates about the possibility of knowing any form of ‘universal truth’ in light of 
increasingly focus on ‘local’ knowledge (Miller, 2001). Thus, instead of searching for an 
elusive ‘truth’, what is interesting are the stories that are currently driving protestors’ 
behaviours, which arguably construct and give form to the moral foundations of their 
protests.  
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‘Stories of justification’: Future, security and the pride of self-sufficiency 
 
One strong story to emerge from this research relates to the future security of those in the 
mining industry. Employment and personal security are without doubt vital components of 
workers’ quality of life, and are reputedly declining in Australia (Kelley & Evans, 1995). 
The unwritten rule of 10 years underground being all a person can physically take, coupled 
with creeping job insecurity, retrenchments and falling wages, lead many to worry about 
their future and that of their families. For one, there was a fear that state pensions were 
shrinking to the point of total disappearance, as the two quotes below show: 
 
There will be no such thing as a pension by the time I retire and let alone when you 
retire – there will be no pensions. So, I mean, how do you live? You’ve got to have 
something.  
 
Male: Because my opinion of superannuation is that I reckon they’re going to stick 
it to us there as well. By the time I’m 65, retire, I think they’ll change the rules and 
we’ll basically get nothing out of our superannuation. So, we thought well, you 
know, it’s about time that we invested in something … 
 
Female: Something for ourselves. 
 
Male: And for the kids as well and it was about that time the old knock on the door 
come. 
 
Thus, a feeling that they had to invest just to secure a liveable future coincided with the 
availability of these schemes. Few felt that their current superannuation policies provided 
adequate return and support, a feeling shared by many other Australians (Webster, 1999). 
In part, this investment urge was driven by signals from the neo-liberal Australian 
Coalition government that individuals must think about providing for themselves and their 
families. This argument is framed as being a by-product of an increasingly aged population 
whose pension demands will push the welfare state to the brink (for example, King et al., 
2001). This policy discourse is taking prevalence in other post-industrial countries (for 
example, Philipps, 2000), and can be seen as part of a broader ‘turning inwards’ from 
community as to the self as welfare provider (Everingham, 2001). As one investor pointed 
out: 
 16
The government are always on to us to do things for yourself so the government 
isn’t supporting you when you’re older and retiring. And then the ATO turn around 
and slug you like this. So, here they are telling us to invest in our future and do the 
right thing and look after yourself, ‘So we’re not paying for you when you retire’, 
and all the rest of it and then they do this.  
 
A further issue this raises is that of knowledge. Researchers have argued that neo-
classical/liberal economic policies effectively change the ‘ground rules’ for citizens. 
Whereas once they had to understand the machinations of the welfare system, they now 
have to grasp new knowledge and become familiar with economic concepts to keep up 
their welfare standards (Anderson, 1998). This knowledge is not always easily accessible, 
understandable or consistent to the average person. Thus, confusion and misguided action 
can often result. 
 
Investment was also driven by a sense of personal and cultural pride at being a self-
sufficient, hard-working Australian, an identity that has great historical and cultural 
resonance (McCarthy, 1999, Horne, 1964, Schachner, 1990). Interviewees were quick to 
point out how they had never claimed any state benefits in their lives, that they had always 
paid their taxes in full and on time, and that they had always tried, economically at least, to 
‘do the right thing’, as the two quotes below suggest: 
 
Because at the end of the day, I mean, we are fully self-sufficient people. We’ve 
never, ever been on the dole. We’ve never lived off the government. My husband 
and I have always worked. We’ve always paid our taxes. We’ve never hidden 
anything, and for this to happen. We’re being punished, you know, and I don’t think 
it’s right at all. I feel really strongly about it.  
 
I’ve served in the military for Australia, I’m an honest hardworking person, I’m 
married, I’ve got two kids, I reckon I’m a pretty upstanding sort of citizen.  
 
As a result, they argued their involvement with schemes was far from being a tax dodge, as 
it was not within their over-all character to take such actions. They saw their paths to 
security achievable without resorting to illegal practices, a feeling shared by many other 
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Australians (for example, Sikora, 2001). Rather, involvement in schemes was first and 
foremost an investment. As one interviewee put it: 
 
I’ve been in the mining game for probably nearly nine or ten years now so in that 
period of time I’ve paid a lot of tax. Never, ever have I ever had an audit done on 
me, never had any queries, no dramas at all, just the average, law abiding person 
that pays their tax. I was at a friend’s place one day and there was this 
representative there. He was going over this scheme called Oracle and at the time, 
with the information that he was giving us, it sounded like it was a great long-term 
investment. Like, we weren’t meant to make any money out of it, any decent sort of 
money out of it, between nine to twenty one years. This was like a twenty year plan.  
 
These individuals have a self-identity of being self-reliant individuals who look outside the 
‘system’ for support, as they believed they were being politically signalled and culturally 
motivated to do. Identity is not merely a personal and/or cognitive construct but a 
definition of an individual as a social ‘object’ (Pakulski & Tranter, 2000). Thus, investors’ 
identities were profoundly compromised by the implications of their amended assessment.  
 
This stems in part from the different models of human action and agency used by the Tax 
Office and the investors. The rulings of the Tax Office frames individuals’ involvement in 
schemes as operating as isolated, autonomous and fiscal decision-makers. By contrast, 
investors see it as just one small part of their previous social actions and relations, in which 
they have tried to be honest and decent (see Helliwell & Hindess (1999) for a discussion of 
different epistemological approaches). Thus, they felt they had earned the right to be 
treated fairly and with discretion, having kept their part to date in a form of undefined 
‘social contract’ between state and individual. To feel that they are labelled as ‘tax cheats’ 
appears to them unfounded and inaccurate, coming as a ‘moral shock’ (Jasper, 1997). This 
reading of the personal/cultural messages sent out by amended assessments laid the 
foundations for the protests that followed, which are discussed in greater detail below. 
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Can’t pay, won’t pay: Social protest in the Goldfields 
 
One of the pragmatic reasons why many have refused to pay their amended assessments is 
that they cannot afford to. Banks will not provide loans or re-mortgages of property for 
people with outstanding tax debts, and few have the assets to raise tens of thousands of 
dollars. Bankruptcy is a bleak option, affecting future financial choices and according to 
interviews, the settlement offers from the Tax Office were not considered reasonable or 
affordable. In terms of trying to pay their amended assessment back, one investor 
commented:  
 
I just don’t have it. I can’t work any more than I’m working. I work like nearly 14 
hours a day, seven days straight and it’s just – they’re not going to get it out of me. 
It’s simple as that. And if they do try and push me, I can only dribble it back at so 
much at a time and I’ll be paying it off for the rest of my life anyway. So, it’s just 
devastating. 
 
Yet, for many, even if they could pay, they would not, as they feel they have been served 
with an absolute moral wrong. Many asked why they should pay back money that they did 
not see, as the vast majority of tax rebates were immediately given to the schemes through 
their tax agents, leaving on average a couple of thousand dollars ‘in hand’ per taxpayer. 
Indeed, any settlement and negotiation was seen as admittance of guilt by some investors. 
For example: 
 
I’ve even received a form because, being the lower end of the scale with one 
licence, I could have signed it, waived all my rights, basically admitted the fact that 
I was a tax cheat – which I’m not – and then start paying. Well, they’re offering 
four per cent [interest] instead of 12 per cent or 14 whatever it was, and now I’ve 
got to just start repaying the money, like – you know, ‘Yes, I’m a tax cheat. All 
right, I’ll take the lower percentage rate and start paying you’, like. Get stuffed. I’m 
not going to do it. 
 
Feelings of indignation about assessments relate to both how they were handled as an 
administrative process by the Tax Office, as well as the implications of assessments for 
these individuals’ futures. To begin with process, all felt that the Tax Office has grossly 
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mismanaged the affair through being slow to make rulings over the legality of the schemes 
and not taking individual circumstances into account when making decisions (see Murphy, 
2002, for further discussions of these points).  
 
Added to this was the insult served to their identity, as mentioned above. The apparent 
cultural pride in being able to be, and being seen to be, a good provider, a hard worker and, 
in sum, a ‘good Australian’ was evident, both in this research and in evidence given to the 
Senate Economics References Committee. Many interviewees talked about themselves as 
‘average’ Australians, and how people like them – the hard workers and high taxpayers – 
were the ‘backbone’ of the country, funding the tax base that provides nation-wide public 
services, few of which appear to be returned and re-invested in rural Australia (see Morgan 
& Murphy, 2001). Indeed, some protestors and their supporters cast themselves as fighting 
for justice for average Australians, contrasting their stance on one web-site, with the 
actions of the Tax Office, which they frame as fundamentally ‘unAustralian’ (Tax 
Resolution website). For example: 
 
The sad thing is too, this is affecting the average backbone of Australia. We’re not 
talking about Kerry Packers and stuff here, they don’t pay any bloody tax and the 
average Australian pays the tax and they’re the backbone of this country and that’s 
who it’s affecting. 
 
As such, interviewees felt justified in categorising themselves as honest Australians who 
are being served an indefensible wrong. This is not surprising in light of research which 
shows that taxpayers often view others’ compliance and over-all honesty as less than their 
own (Coleman & Freeman, 1997). This is also reinforced by media attention given to 
corporate approaches to tax (non) compliance (see Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001), 
evident in the fact that the majority of interviews in this research reference the emblematic 
case of Kerry Packer.  
 
Yet, this view of themselves as honest taxpayers was not only about self-identity, but also 
about a form of collective identity, both ‘imagined’ and concrete (for example, Polletta & 
Jasper, 2001). Although ‘class’ is a much-debated concept, it is no doubt highly relevant to 
contemporary Australia (for example, Kuhn & O'Lincoln, 1996, McGregor, 1997). In this 
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research, interviewees felt their social position as the epitome of the taken-for-granted 
working class was further insulted and morally eroded by the Tax Office’s actions. This 
experience reinforced perceptions that they are the workers, or ‘pawns’ or ‘little people’ 
and that the ‘top end of town’ is populated by the privileged few who can break laws to 
their own desire without having to worry.  
 
The seeming inconsistency or irony of these opinions needs to be noted. By comparative 
standards to other manual workers in Australia, these individuals are on very high wages 
and could, economically at least, be considered middle class. Yet, they consider themselves 
as the archetypes of the working class. To understand this point, it is important to 
remember the contextual factors of this case study (for example, how the money was 
earned and the living conditions in the Goldfields). Added to this, research has shown how 
individuals often position themselves ‘in the middle’ in terms of class evaluations (Kelley 
& Evans, 1995). That is, individuals do not decide which class they belong to through 
objectively judging their material circumstances. Rather, ‘subjective images of equality 
and consensus among family, friends and co-workers’ (Kelley & Evans, 1995, p. 157) are 
used to build these pictures. In this sense, protestors are typical in seeing themselves 
sandwiched between those who strain the welfare system by choosing not to work, and 
those who gain excess privilege from their social status. This latter attitude is somewhat 
supported in the Australian population at large, where many feel big businesses, their 
managers, as well as senior barristers and judges pay less than their fair share of tax (see 
Braithwaite et al., 2001). 
 
As well as personal and collective identity, many investors talked about the alleged 
shortsighted logic of the amended assessments. They felt the Tax Office’s actions 
amounted to essentially financially ruining families to collect revenue that will then have 
to be spent on their welfare and future support when they are destitute, as the quote below 
shows: 
 
[It’s] just so, so wrong. Here’s 58 000 Australians – and let’s take out the couple of 
percent who are maybe tax cheats – so let’s say there’s even 50 000 people plus 
their families who, in good faith, invested in Australia and for that they’re going to 
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lose everything. I mean, yeah, there’s some that can pay back. But then there’s the 
others who will lose everything, and then there’s the others who have taken their 
lives. 
 
This also shows how many did not see the actions of the Tax Office as ‘black-boxed’ away 
from other state agencies. In short, Australian taxation officers know all too well the 
boundaries of their institutional ambit. By contrast, many citizens do not see these 
boundaries and instead lump together all the actions of state agencies as ‘the government’. 
Thus, they cannot understand why ‘the government’ would choose to take with one hand 
what it will then have to offer back with another.  
 
Others dwelt on how it had destroyed lives and marriages. The extract below concerns a 
meeting that took place between some investors and community workers in Kalgoorlie, 
local politicians and individuals from the Tax Office. 
 
So we got onto a discussion of ‘a line in the sand’. A couple of people in the ATO 
and one of the politicians in attendance had this huge issue that if they did that, 
there might be some people that actually tried to rort the system and might actually 
get away with it. And that really pissed me off because I thought, you know, you’re 
prepared to let people take their own lives provided a few people don’t actually 
manage to cheat the system.  
 
This scenario was deemed so outrageously lacking in commonsense that protestors 
withdrew from taking part in any negotiation process with the Tax Office, feeling 
legitimised in their moral position of refusing to pay and publicly declaring as such. As one 
interviewee put it: 
 
Your legitimate tax cheats, you go after them, they deserve it but as far as we’re 
concerned, we are not tax cheats. We did nothing wrong. You know, we tried to do 
something right and we’ve been burnt by it. 
 
The feelings of being judged by others as tax cheats for some only added strength to their 
feelings of indignation. For example: 
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I went to see X about it, and I was disgusted with him. He basically said to me that 
anybody that invests in that kind of investment is greedy. So, what he’s saying is 
that my husband is greedy. And I looked at him and I thought, how can you say 
that? You know, that’s not right. 
 
This created a feeling that investors were being stigmatised, not only in their own 
community but also across Australia. 
 
Why the Goldfields?  
 
Although thousands of people across Australia have been involved in the schemes, some of 
the strongest voices of protest to emerge have been from the Goldfields. Why is this? For 
one, there is the simple fact that this region was targeted more aggressively than any other 
spatially proximate collection of individuals anywhere else in Australia. Also, the nature of 
how people got involved in schemes – through work, friends and family – meant that 
individuals quickly knew of others receiving amended assessments. Even though (and 
maybe because) the Goldfields are geographically isolated, the communities are small and 
highly networked. Thus, the dense networks that had fuelled high numbers of individuals 
investing in the first place later fuelled the protests. As one interviewee put it: 
 
And I think you have to understand how people receive information in the mining 
industry. It is through talking to one another, they talk shop. They work 12 hours a 
day, they work 84 hours a week, they often work underground. They have small 
peer group relationships. 
 
These small peer groups meant the word was quick to spread. Even though the actual 
number of people involved does not appear to exceed one thousand, the prevalence of 
networks as the main sources of communication makes it feel like everyone is somehow 
involved. And with so many individuals’ friends and family touched by amended 
assessments, private anger became collective indignation, adding strength to the feeling 
that somehow, their lives and communities were being assaulted. As people began to talk 
about their experiences and realise how many others were involved, the protest network 
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also doubled as a support network, which enabled those affected to share and cope with 
this major negative life event (see Finkenauer & Rime, 1998).  
 
It seems therefore that there was a critical mass of people in the Goldfields – and a key few 
who were willing to take initial moves of pulling the community together – who shared 
similar feelings of outrage and who were having similar distressing experiences. This 
culmination of collectivity, of ‘not being alone’ and conclusions that if they could not pay, 
they had nothing to lose in protesting, created a moral determination to fight the Tax Office 
and to not feel ashamed of what had happened to them: 
 
You see, there’s a lot of us are alike. We don’t give a shit, we’re going to scream all 
the way, you know. And then there’s the other ones that go, ‘I don’t want to talk 
about it, I’m so ashamed, I feel like a fool,’ you know, ‘I don’t want anyone to 
know what my situation is.’ Well, I’m like, ‘Stuff it. It’s not just me.’ There’s so 
many other people in this one town and various towns around us. Like, Kambalda 
and Menzies and Leonora and Leinster and all that. There’s just so many people so 
I’m not ashamed. I didn’t do anything wrong. 
 
Added to this, there was a regional identity that was evoked through protests. Many felt 
that the Goldfields was an isolated area with particular needs and people, often ignored and 
misunderstood and passed judgment on by other Australians: 
 
… because in the eastern States they think, ‘Oh, tax cheats, let them go’. They don’t 
look at – the people involved are ordinary people, you know, husbands and wives 
and are people like myself who are involved in the community, and then go and 
suicide and stuff like that. We just – it’s traumatic. I sit here and I listen to people 
talking about suicide and bankruptcy and stuff and like, you just feel for them.  
 
The reported tough life of the Goldfields was suggested to give rise to ‘tough’ people, who 
had their own way of dealing with issues. One interviewee called this a ‘Kalgoorlie 
approach’ and another stated that the area was run on ‘Kalgoorlie rules’. As one 
interviewee put it: 
 
It’s not in our nature to lay down and die. We’re scrappers, I’m afraid, to use a 
pretty sort of ordinary word, we’re scrappers. I’ll dig my heels in. 
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Thus these experiences helped to re/create a regional identity that saw Goldfields 
inhabitants as different, misunderstood and resilient. This is not at odds with their views of 
themselves as Australians, as Yuval-Davis has pointed out: ‘People’s membership in a 
state, their rights and responsibilities, are mediated by their membership in other 
collectivities and polities, sub-, cross- and supra-state’ (Yuval-Davis, 1999, p. 131). This 
identity thus did not diminish but rather added to the strength of their convictions.  
 
The cultural politics of social protest against the Tax Office 
 
One community worker interviewed argued that protestors’ anger is misplaced. Instead of 
feeling angry with the Tax Office, it is the scheme promoters who are the real culprits. 
There is some merit in this point. Those involved in schemes still trading cannot 
understand why the Tax Office could call their investment business a ‘sham’. However, 
those involved with companies that have since ceased trading are quicker to point the 
finger of blame at promoters (that is, they now feel that their business investment was not 
legitimate). Added to this, the Internet sites and other forms of communication do appear 
to be spaces where rumour and counter-rumour, often unsubstantiated, are aired, thus 
adding to the justifications of investors and their feelings of persecution which are not 
always with grounding. 
 
Yet, rather than simply dismiss protests as whipped-up hysteria, or that protestors are being 
lead by the nose through the fighting funds or other interest groups, these protests can tell 
us something about issues affecting governance in Australia. One argument focuses on the 
contrasting epistemological stances of the Tax Office and protestors. That is, 
administrative governance decisions do not just reside in the individual and social domains 
of bureaucratic rationality, echoing the ‘perspective of the state’ (Taylor, 1998). Instead, 
regulatory rulings send out symbolic and cultural messages, blurring and challenging the 
existence of supposed boundaries between private and private spheres of governance (for 
example, Della Porta & Diani, 1999, Lemke, 2001). Whilst agencies may discursively 
focus on law and revenue, the implications and messages of these discourses, both material 
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and symbolic, are deeply affective to individuals in terms of their own identities, their 
social positions and their prospective futures as citizens.  
 
This is because economy and culture are not separate spheres of cognition or practice. 
Rather: ‘economic logics work in and through a whole set of cultural processes which give 
everyday sense to the outcomes of society’ (Jacobs, 1999, p. 13). Thus, the idea that 
Goldfields protests are about money and taxation, plain and simple, is untenable in light of 
investors’ concerns over their identity, security, faith and the future. This merging of these 
protest drivers defies any attempt to theoretically black-box social protests and their actors 
into categories such as self and other focussed, material and post-material. Rather, they 
exist in the fuzzy space of being both at the same time (Goodwin et al., 2001). 
 
And as such tax becomes a site of ‘cultural politics’. This is the idea that ‘all social life 
must be seen as potentially political, where politics is the contestation of relations of 
power’ (Nash, 2001, p. 77). Here, the power struggles in the form of protests are both 
material (that is, not paying tax bill) and symbolic (public protests, fighting funds). Thus, 
what was once purely personal (that is, tax) now becomes an issue for debate and 
contestation. 
 
What is also significant is how protesters have withdrawn from previously cooperative 
systems of economic governance. This suggests they signal a potential opening of new 
cleavages or points of questioning in Australia today. As mentioned earlier in this paper, 
Melucci (1989) argues that citizenship struggles are not over. Rather the different 
dimensions of conflict have taken on new shapes. In this light tax has (re) emerged as a 
dimension of conflict that challenges the logic of state or institutional regulatory practices. 
Protestors are collectively impelling a more humanistic approach to social management 
through resisting the ‘bureaucratisation’ of their lives (Buechler, 1995). And as such they 
open up new possibilities for political contestation (for example, Nash, 2000). Or as 
Melucci (1989, p. 1) framed it: 
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Social movements [also] publicize grievances and uncertainties about everyday life, 
as well as challenge the less visible power relationships crystallized in its shared 
conventions and sense of normalcy. 
 
Thus, the normalcy of deferring to law, or feeling shame for alleged wrong-doing, have 
been made redundant by the protest in the Goldfields. Here, the cultural politics of tax has 
started to uncover issues of power relations that, as Melucci suggests, remain ‘less visible’ 
in everyday life. What began as amended assessments in the post to a few thousand people 
became a public challenge to the legitimacy of a powerful government agency. This 
challenge was based on moral justifications of being a good Australian who has been 
served a wrong by the very system that they, and other workers like them, are financing, 
and which they believe is meant to be looking after their welfare. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
I spoke to that many guys on the mine sites that say, ‘Up their arse, they are not 
getting a red cent out of me, I will go on the dole for the next three years, I will do 
whatever it takes to not give them a red cent’. And that’s their attitude. 
 
Despite the concessions offered by the Tax Office, many investors state they will only feel 
vindicated by a ‘line in the sand’. Indeed, it seems that only the Federal Court ruling on 
schemes will elicit some individuals’ willingness to now think about settling their debts or 
going bankrupt (Buffini & Fabro, 2002). Attempts to draw or force these taxpayers back 
into cooperation and recognition of the authority of the Tax Office, no matter how 
reasonable they may appear to others, will be a struggle, to say the least. In this research, 
investors talked about actively and purposefully disengaging from the tax system now and 
into the future, such as paying cash for services wherever possible. Others commented that 
they would rather go on the dole than keep working the rest of their lives just to pay the 
Tax Office, as the quote at the beginning of this section shows. Indeed, the goal of giving 
‘those bastards’ as little money as possible seems to have been transformed into a moral 
mission by many (see also Murphy, 2002). Although fiscally this position is detrimental to 
Australian-wide public welfare, economic arguments fall on deaf ears when put to those 
affected by amended assessments.  
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Does this suggest that these protests are an aberration, an unfortunate alignment of events, 
personalities and social trends? Perhaps, but there are also important lessons to be learnt. 
One signals the implications of these protests for issues of governance in Australia, in 
particular in relation to tax. In one sense, these protests are defensive and reactive, 
focussing on this one specific issue they want resolved for personal benefit. This suggests 
that protestors are ‘nomads of the present’ (Melucci, 1989). Melucci coined this phrase to 
help explain why much social protest today appears to lack utopian visions as end goals 
compared to, for example, socialism or deep ecology. Rather, protest is often issue 
focussed, looking for the resolution of one problem, and often nothing more beyond that. 
In this case study, the investors want their ‘line in the sand’. If this were granted, no doubt 
the vast majority would cease protest and political activities. 
 
However, these protests are also productive. There is a tearing open of the prevailing 
divide between culture and economy held so central to state modus operandi. This is not a 
unique event but rather marks the constant creation and re-creation of how citizens relate to 
the state. Here, there is a new understanding of what the ‘social contract’ should and does 
mean. Individuals are not just bowing down to others interpretations and message about 
who they are and what their actions means. Instead, the age-old fight for identity and 
security continues, but in different forms. And as such, institutions of governance cannot 
afford to ‘stand-still’ in their conceptualisations of who and how to govern.  
 
For one, many would argue that the adoption of the discourses of fairness, individuality 
and openness – such as in the Taxpayers’ Charter – reflect this willingness to engage with 
the cultural aspects of citizenry. Yet, the adoption of the contestable and personally 
constructed concepts such as ‘fairness’ does open the way for calls of duplicity, especially 
if institutions are seen to not put concepts through into practice. In the eyes of citizens, 
these failures are potentially devastating, as this case study shows. Researchers have 
pointed out the need to find creative, adaptable and flexible regulatory enforcement 
solutions (Tenbrunsel, 1999, Tomkins et al., 2001).  
 
This case study bears those assertions out empirically. Although there is no doubt more 
qualitative research is needed into how contemporary Australians view their regulatory 
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institutions, these protests suggest that new spaces of contestation – or a new defiance 
(Braithwaite forthcoming) – face institutions when their actions evoke and seemingly 
betray debates about citizenship and governance. In these circumstances, values 
underpinning notions of paying tax as the ‘right thing’ to do disappears, and the Tax 
Office’s ‘benign big gun’ (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992) is suddenly out of bullets. Even if 
the individuals in this case study are beyond ‘free and frank’ discussions needed to find 
adaptive regulatory solutions (Braithwaite, forthcoming), institutions should not shy away 
from thinking about how those conversations might sound in the future. One first step 
might be to acknowledge protestors’ claims as legitimate. This does not mean conceding 
on points of law, only understanding that the contexts and outcomes of involvement with 
schemes reach far and beyond the ambit of law and economy. Perhaps then the cultural 
politics of governance will become the focus of discussion that this case study suggests as 
imperative. 
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